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Chapter pages in book: (1 - 15)Now and then one of the friends of the Na-
tional Bureau urges us to spend some of our
energy on the analysis of current business con-
ditions. This interest in the state of the econ-
omy is understandable, especially at a time
like the present. The direction in which the
economy is moving currently is a matter of
serious concern to all persons charged with the
management of affairs, large or small. Any
PART clue we could provide to the course of events
during the weeks and months ahead of us
would be of immediate practical value.
Yet the National Bureau holds fast to the
B
- proam of basic research mapped out at its
inception. We continue to devote ourselves
largely to broad, persistent economic ques-
tions. Our object is to ascertain important Research economicfacts, to uncover fundamental prin-
ciples of economic behavior —factsand prin-
ciples that will be of use in dealing with every andthe majorproblem of policy. And such results
cannot be secured easily. By their very nature,
the studies we undertake cannot promise quick Analysisof guidanceto those who must make their de-
cisions today.
It goes without saying that we would like to Current beof immediate help to those around us. We
are irked no less than others by the slow pace
of our work. At least as keenly as they, we
Bus I n e are aware of the "general" character of our
results and the frequency with which we label
them "tentative." It is not indifference to the
Conditions importanceof current economic analysis that
leads us to resist the pressures to take a hand
in it. Nor is it because we wish to keep above
the heat and dust of the life about us, for the
pressures come also from within ourselves.
We concentrate on basic economic research
because we believe that in this way we can
make the best contribution of which we are
capable to the analysis of current business
conditions —notimmediately, to be sure, but
in the long run.
In support of this belief there is the lesson
This report was presented at the annual meeting of
the Board of Directors of the National Bureau, held
in New York City February 27, 1956. I am greatly
indebted to my colleagues for helpful suggestions on
Part One, and to Geoffrey H. Moore for advice and
assistance on Parts Two and Three as well.of experience. The basic work we have done
in the past is being widely used by others in
their day-by-day analysis of business condi-
tions. The value these applications now yield
and may continue to yield in the future could
not have been realized had we diverted our
attention in the past to the immediate ques-
tions of those days.
There is a second reason.The ability of
men to judge the present state of the economy
and trace its tendencies into the future is far
from satisfactory.This, perhaps, is why we
are asked to join in that difficult task. But the
implication we draw is not that of prompt ac-
ceptance of the request.There is painfully
much still to be learned about the basic fa-
tures of our economy. We have a staff ex-
perienced in such work and devoted to it.
Whatever we can do today to expand tested
economic knowledge is an investment that,
with all its risks, is likely to pay larger social
dividends than any current analysis that might
engage our energies..
Let me illustrate our experience with an ex-
ample or two of the uses being made of our
work in current business analysis; and put be-
fore you one or two of the basic questions
which, if answered, might strengthen our abil-
ity to judge the trend of economic events.
I
The year 1955 closed with the American peo-
ple standing, we have all been told, at "the
threshold of a 400 bifflon dollar economy" —
measuredin terms of annual gross national
product. After provision for capital consumed,
and after other adjustments to determine net
income, the nation's total earnings in produc-
tion in the last quarter of the year came to an
annual rate of some 330 billion. Of this, 300
biffion went in the form of personal income
to families (including unattached individuals).
A figure of such size is hard to grasp. Let
us therefore see what family income and re-
lated figures mean per family. In the last quar-
ter of 1955, then, income per family averaged
about $5,750 on an annual basis.Income
taxes took about $650, leaving disposable in-
come of about $5,100. Personal consumption
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expenditures were running at an annual rate
of $4,750 per family. The balance is family
savings. These savings were financing about
two-thirds of the additions being made to the
nation's stock of housing, business plant and
equipment, and inventories, with the rest fi-
nanced out of corporate savings.Families
were, of course, borrowing as well as lending
and investing —thoughdoing more of the lat-
ter, on the average —andin the fourth quarter
of 1955 the net mortgage, instalment, and
other consumer debt was increasing at an an-
nual rate of over $400 per family.
We know also that toward the end of 1955
families were receiving incomes of about $400
more than a year earlier, were paying income
taxes of about $40 more, were spending for
consumption about $300 more, were saving
about $50 more, and that these savings were
net of an additional $80 of debt accumulation
—allat annual rates.
These are enough to indicate the kind of
figures we can follow and the kind of story we
can read from month to month or quarter to
quarter if we wish. We are close to being up
to date on statistics that reveal the average
economic position of many millions of families
and many thousands of business enterprises
and governmental units.Figures on the na-
tion's economic activity are common currency
today. They appear in virtually every analysis
of current business conditions.
Not many years ago —weneed go no further
back than the early 1930's —notone of the
measures I have cited was available on a cur-
rent basis. During the prolonged contraction
in business that began in 1929 we had no regu-
lar reports on gross national product or na-
tional income; we had no current estimates —
oreven clear notions of the meaning —ofin-
vestment or savings; we had only vague ideas
of the volume of consumer spending or pur-
chases by government; we knew littleof
changes in consumer debt. Even the direction
of movement of aggregate economic activity
from season to season, let alone from month
to month, was not clear. Some of us can recall
the wide variety of guesses about the severity
of the depression current at the time and theuncertainty and fear that surrounded individ-
ual families, businessmen, and responsible gov-
ernmental officials who had to make their
plans and carry on their functions in heart-
breaking darkness.
It was not, in fact, until the Department of
Commerce began to publish annual estimates
of national income in 1935 that a comprehen-
sive measure of economic activity of the sort
we now take for granted became available on
a regular basis. Monthly estimates of income
payments began to be issued in 1938; annual
and then quarterly reports on gross national
product and its components, not until the
1940's.
Let us recall the events leading up to the
appearance of regular official estimates of na-
tional income and product and their major
components, for this provides my first illustra-
tion of how the National Bureau's basic work
has contributed to current business analysis.
In 1920 the Board of Directors of the
National Bureau selected for the new organi-
zation's first project the subject of national in-
come. The choice was made because national
income was "a subject of fundamental impor-
tance in which the truth is hard to find."
Further, it was "an aspect of the whole econ-
omy" that "provided a framework within
which economic factors could be seen in their
organic relation to one another." That is,
study of national income could provide an-
swers to some of the crucial questions that
troubled people —thelevel of average income,
whether it was growing as rapidly as the popu-
lation, in what proportion different sources
contributed to it, how it was distributed among
individuals, how the total and its parts fluctu-
ated with changes in business conditions; and
study of income could build a base from which
further investigation of these and related ques-
tions —alldealing with fundamental features
of the economy —mightproceed. It was basic
economic research of the sort which needed
doing, and which the National Bureau had
been organized to do.
The two volumes on national income during
1909-1919 that Mitchell, King, Knauth, and
Macaulay prepared were soon followed by
complementary studies of the distribution of
income among states by Knauth and Leven.
A revision and extension of basic sections of
the original study came in 1930 with King's
volume on National income and its Purchas-
ing Power. These reports helped establish the
practicability of estimates of national income
and its distribution and behavior which could
be widely accepted as reliable and put to use
by persons with different purposes in mind.
The usefulness of national income estimates
was soon to be recognized by the Congress.
In 1932 the Senate asked the Department of
Commerce to prepare official estimates of na-
tional income for 1929-1931, in order to
measure the severity of the great contraction
under way and ascertain its impact on the
various sections of the economy. The National
Bureau was invited to cooperate in the work,
and Simon Kuznets of the National Bureau's
staff went to the Department of Commerce to
plan and supervise the study and write the
report.
Almost at the same time, in December
1932, the Committee on Credit and Banking
of the Social Science Research Council out-
lined a program of studies in banking policy
and credit control in relation to economic sta-
bility. The first stage of inquiry proposed was
a statistical study of the formation of capital.
There were then no reliable facts available on
the aggregate volume or composition of this
item, so significant for economic stability as
well as economic growth. Even a historical
record of investment was lacking. A few years
earlier, when Mitchell was writing his Business
Cycles: The Problem and Its Setting, he was
not able to include information on capital
formation as such —agap in the basic data of
which he was keenly aware. While he could
guess the average annual volume of total capi-
tal formation from figures on savings, and
could estimate the relative importance of the
different types of capital goods in the stock of
national wealth, he knew little more: the rela-
tive importance of home-building and other
construction, equipment purchases, inventory
accumulation, foreign investment, and pro-
duction of consumer durables —theirrate of
3growth —theirfluctuations —thesewere still
to be determined.
The Committee asked the National Bureau
to study these questions. The offer was ac-
cepted, and in January 1933 Kuznets, who was
bringing the Department of Commerce study
of national income to a close, took over its
direction. What he was learning in the study
of income led him to broaden the scope of the
capital formation project to cover the produc-
tion of all types of commodities and thus make
it possible to fit capital formation into the
structureofaccountsunderlyingnational
product and income. Two notable volumes
resulted, National Income and Capital Forma-
tion and Commodity Flow and Capital For-
mation, as well as several bulletins presenting
preliminary results.
While Kuznets was working on his later
National Income and Its Composition, Shaw,
who had assisted him in the earlier studies,
turned to a study of commodity flow and capi-
tal formation in the period between the Civil
War and World War I (published as Value of
Commodity Output since 1869). When the
Department of Commerce, which had already
initiated regular annual and then monthly sup-
plements to the earlier report on national in-
come, decided to add complementary data on
capital formation and commodity flow, Shaw
left to join the Department's staff to take
charge of that section of their work.Since
then, as we all know, there have appeared the
famous July 1947 Supplement to the Survey
of Current Business, which presented an inte-
grated collection of national income and prod-
uct statistics —includingcapital formation —
forthe United States during 1929-1946; and
the equally valuable July 1951 Supplement,
which presented the detailed basis of the esti-
mates. We now have at our disposal frequent
periodic reports on capital formation, con-
sumer expenditures, governmental purchases
of goods and services, total national product,
personal income, and related magnitudes.
Other examples of current economic statis-
tics in which the National Bureau has had a
hand might be added, but I have said enough
to make my point. We do well to concentrate
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on basic studies. Only these can point to the
kind of information needed to assess the cur-
rent economic scene. It is in such studies that
concepts are thought through, sources of data
examined and compared, methods of combin-
ing and reducing data tested, biases deter-
mined, significance explored. Before "facts"
can be reported regularly, much work needs to
be done. We have far to go before further
work of this sort is no longer necessary.
Indeed, continuing work needs to be done
even on existing material. The development
of good economic statistics is an endless task.
Concepts need to be reviewed and revised as
our understanding deepens, as new data ap-
pear, as standards of accuracy rise and needs
expand, and as the march of events makes cur-
rent measures less satisfactory approximations
to the quantities we are trying to determine.
An example is the current measure of personal
savings. This allows for increases in consumer
instalment debt but does not take into account
the additions to consumers' assets that are fi-
nanced by the debt. When automobiles and
other equipment constituted a small item in
consumers' budgets and the practice of instal-
ment financing was of modest proportions, this
inconsistency was of little moment. But that
seems no longer to be true: as Goldsmith's
calculations suggest, inclusion of net increases
in holdings of consumer durable goods would
put personal savings in recent years at a level
considerably higher than is shown by the cur-
rent measures, and the pattern of year-to-year
changes in percentage of income saved might
be significantly altered.In his study of the
consumption function Friedman defined sav-
ings in the more inclusive fashion.
Whenever we use existing information in
our studies we subject it to critical review and
thus suggest improvements. The appendices
to our reports that contain our observations on
the quality of the data utilized are, we know,
read with interest by the compilers of those
data. Our conferences also contribute. A few
months ago the Conference on Research in In-
come and Wealth spent two days examining
the national accounts of the Department of
Commerce. One of the questions discussedwas the concept of personal savings. All who
participated —thestaff of the National Income
Division of the Department of Commerce,
other government officials, university profes-
sors, business economists and statisticians, and
members of our own staff —profitedfrom the
experience. On occasion, also, members of
our staff have taken time from their research
work to serve in advisory capacities to govern-
mental agencies engaged in statistical work. I
have already mentioned Kuznets' early activi-
ties; most recently five of our staff participated
in the work organized by the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System at the re-
quest of the Joint Committee on the Economic
Report: Goldsmith and Kuznets on the Com-
mittee on Savings Statistics, Abramovitz and
Mack on the Committee on Inventory Statis-
tics, and Hastay on the Committee on General
Business Expectations.
In my brief illustration I have merely al-
luded to a significant point. Selection of useful
measures of economic activity and interpreta-
tion of their meaning always involve some-
thing more than "fact-finding" —morethan
carefully fitting statistics into a sound concep-
tual mold. It is necessary to have some notion
of the pattern and sequence of events if eco-
nomic statistics are to be reliable guide-posts.
And this, of course, is a main objective of our
work. As I have suggested, our contribution
to current reporting is largely a by-product of
work on the enduring features of economic be-
havior.It is time, therefore, to turn to my
second illustration of the practical uses of eco-
nomic research.
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During the winter of 1937-1938 it became
clear that the climb out of the depths of the
great depression had come to a halt and that
the interruption was more than a minor set-
back. The shrinkage in business activity that
had been taking place during the summer and
fall had reached serious proportions. There
was considerable anxiety as to how far the
contraction would go and what signs might in-
dicate its end.
It was then that a public agency requested
the National Bureau to prepare a memoran-
dum on statistical indicators of cyclical reviv-
als. The request was urgent, the time short.
Little of significance could be expected from
information quickly thrown together and ana-
lyzed by impromptu methods. It was necessary
to have some capital to exploit.
When its initial work on national income had
been completed, the National Bureau turned
a major part of its energies to another piece of
basic research —businesscycles. This subject,
too, was "one of great importance to all classes
in the community," as our annual report men-
tioned at the time.It was a subject, also, in
which quantitative methods could be used to
advantage. No one else was planning a com-
prehensive survey of the whole subject. The
staff "seemed" qualified by experience and in-
terest to fill the want. And much of the knowl-
edge gained in studying fluctuations in the
national income would be usable here.
By 1937 the National Bureau had a large
collection of statistical materialsat hand.
These had been subjected to considerable anal-
ysis and the staff had thought deeply about
their meaning. This investment could be mo-
bilized to yield something useful about indi-
cators of cyclical revivals even in the brief time
available. The Bureau took on the assignment.
Almost five hundred American monthly or
quarterly series in our possession —serieson
production, employment, prices, security is-
sues, orders, and the like —wereexamined by
Mitchell, Burns and their co-workers, and for
each the timing of its changes in relation to
business revivals was determined. From this
list were selected the series that had been toler-
ably consistent in their timing and were of
"sufficiently general interest to warrant some
attention by students of current economic
conditions."These, numbering seventy-one,
were listed in an elaborate table showing the
average lead or lag for each series; and to help
its users, Mitchell and Burns added informa-
tion on the variability of timing —for"toler-
able" hardly meant "perfect" consistency —
andon such other characteristics of each series
as might be needed in judging the significance
of its changes.
SThey did not stop there. From the list of
seventy-one series,a further selection was
made of the most trustworthy indicators. At-
tention was given to the length of average lead,
uniformity of lead, frequency and intensity of
erratic movements, length of the record, and
other criteria. None of the series could meet
all the criteria well; Mitchell and Burns se-
lected twenty-one that fared best, on the whole.
And to their lists of indicators, Mitchell and
Burns added a carefully prepared list of "cau-
tions" for the guidance of those who must
chart our position in the business cycle at any
specific time. These were at least as valuable
a part of their memorandum as the selection
of series indicating cyclical revival.
We have become so familiar during the past
eighteen years with the statistics and character-
istic cyclical behavior of many economic proc-
esses, that it is difficult to remember the impact
of this memorandum —publishedas a Bulletin
in May 1938 —oneconomists and business
analysts at the time. Here for the first time
was an analysis of a large body of statistics
that was at once penetrating and comprehen-
sive, that sought uniformities of behavior but
did not ignore variability, that revealed sharp
awareness of the day-to-day problems of busi-
ness analysis as well as a deep understanding
of the complexities inherent in the scientific
analysis of business cycles. The paper must
have seemed a revelation to its readers.
Since publication of the memorandum the
National Bureau has extended the analysis of
cyclical indicators in various directions. Be-
fore I report the sequel, let me underscore the
large amount of unhurried work that built the
basis for the memorandum.
First, techniques of measuring business cy-
cles had to be devised in the light of hypotheses
concerning their nature, study and comparison
of existing statistical methods, review of avail-
able statistical data, and experience with the
methods tentatively selected. The chapters in
Mitchell's 1927 volume constituted a major
step in this task; the two reports that Mitchell
wrote at different stages of his progress in
applying the techniques —reportshe called
"experimental" and decided not to publish —
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another step; the 1935 Bulletin by Mitchell
and Burns on the National Bureau's measures
of cyclical behavior, a third.Still other stages
preparatory to the analysis of cyclical indica-
tors, and following it, are hidden in the large
volume on Measuring Business Cycles that
Burns and Mitchell published in 1946.
Second, a vast quantity of statistical data
had to be gathered, if the various economic
processes involved in business cycles were to
be properly studied.This meant more than
copying ready-made series out of standard
sources. Frequently it meant piecing together
series from the individual issues of business
periodicals, which in turn required a search
through possible sources; and sometimes it
meant also the elaborate calculations and care-
ful judgment that Macaulay and then Durand
put into the preparation of their widely used
series on bond yields. In addition, it was nec-
essary to determine, so far as possible, the pre-
cise nature of the process reported by each
series and the reliability of the information
provided —whichmight mean seeking expla-
nations for differences between one source and
another, or one series and another. All this
work had to be checked. Nor did this essential
step end when the figures were neatly arrayed.
Charting each series and putting it through the
analysis frequently raised further questions as
to its meaning and reliability, and these had
to be cleared up.
Third, a set of reference dates had to be de-
termined —dateswith which the timing of
individual series could be compared. Thorp's
study of business annals was part of this task;
determination of the month around which the
cyclical upturns in the various series clustered
was another. The few pages on dating business
cycles in Measuring Business Cycles do not
indicate the magnitude of the task. Nor do the
few words in Part Three, below, on the de-
termination of the recent reference dates.
Fourth, each series to be analyzed had to be
examined for seasonal fluctuations; and when
these were found —aswas usually the case —
theyhad to be removed to permit cyclical
changes to stand out clearly. This was a large
task, not only because of the amount of arith-metic that goes into determining and removing
a seasonal change, but also because more than
one method sometimes had to be tried. The
easy device, frequently favored by business-
men and journalists, of comparing the current
month with the corresponding month of last
year could not be used because it is inefficient
and can be misleading. Matters may be worsen-
ing even when current levels exceed those of
last year. They may be worsening also when
the excess this month is greater than that of
the previous month —becauseof a changing
seasonal, or because an interruption to expan-
sion which proved to be minor a year ago may
not prove so again. Recently we have been
experimenting with electronic calculators for
the purpose of determining seasonal fluctua-
tions, and we hope to extend these experiments
in the coming year —aninterest that indicates
how burdensome the removal of seasonals is
at present.
Finally, almOst an equal amount of labor
went into determining, for each of the five
hundred series, its average lead or lag, the
variation about the average, and the other
characteristics of cyclical behavior mentioned
earlier.
Spelling out these steps can only suggest
how the information at the disposal of Mitchell
and Burns in 1937 had been accumulated. It
may also serve, however, to indicate what is
generally involved in the application of quan-
titative methods to economic analysis and why
scholars working by themselves are under a
serious handicap in dealing effectively with
many economic questions.
Shortly after the war we decided to turn
back to the question of statistical indicators.
It had not been neglected in the interim, for
Mitchell and other members of the staff were
working steadily on the determination and ex-
planation of the characteristic cyclical behav-
ior of various economic processes; but the
Employment Act of 1946 had been passed and
another close look at the sequence of changes
that take place at turning points in business
promised a useful guide to those who would
have to bear the responsibilities imposed by
the Act.
Moore, who was in charge of the task, not
only extended the analysis through the busi-
ness cycle of 1933-1938, but also took ad-
vantage of the fact that the Bureau had added
many series to its collection —bythat time
eight hundred in number —andhad improved
the measures of cyclical behavior. He revised
the indicators of revivals, paying more atten-
tion to coinciding and lagging series (follow-
ing up suggestions in the Mitchell-Burns paper)
as a valuable confirmation of the indications of
the leaders; applied the analysis also to reces-
sions; and experimented with other techniques
of analysis. The results appeared in his Occa-
sional Paper, published in 1950, which has
attained a degree of popularity unusual for
National Bureau publications.
The list of indicators of cyclical revivals
(and recessions) that he presented differed
from the earlier selection for a number of
reasons, two of which are of interest here.
One was the appearance of series not available
before —grossnational product, personal in-
come, and consumer instalment debt, among
others. Another was the guidance he obtained
from cyclicalanalysescarried on atthe
National Bureau after 1938 —Mitchell's,of
course,and Abramovitz's on inventories,
Barger's on corporate profits and personal
income, Burns' on construction, Evans' on in-
corporations, Haberler's on consumer instal-
ment credit, and Hultgren's on transportation.
Moore's list reflected less the mechanical sift-
ing of time series that Mitchell and Burns had
been compelled to rely on to some degree, and
more the reasoned choice that study of the
chain of events during business cycles makes
possible.
With the passage of time, generalizations
derived from the experience of one period can
be checked against later experience. Moore
was able to test the twenty-one indicators se-
lected by Mitchell and Burns against their
timing in 1938; and later he took advantage
of the postwar experience to test his own list,
since it was derived from information available
only through 1938.Despite the substantial
secular and structural changes that we know
have occurred in the economy, and the fact
7that every business cycle is influenced by spe-
cial factors that distinguish it from its fellows,
the tests were encouraging. They showed a
family resemblance between the later cycles
and those of earlier years. In this respect, there
has been no obvious alteration in the nature of
business cycles.
The comparison may be illustrated with the
behavior of the indicators during the revival
centered at August 1954. Among the series
that presage turns in general business are the
financial processes, investment commitments,
and other sensitive factors that generally initi-
ate and respond to the very beginnings of re-
vival or recession and contribute to its spread
—processesrepresented among the indicators
by liabilities of business failures, industrial
common stock prices, new orders and con-
tracts for investment goods, new incorpora-
tions, hours worked, and sensitive prices of
basic commodities. At the beginning of 1954
half of these eight series were rising, and in
May —threemonths before the trough in busi-
ness —allwere going up. Generally coinciding
or nearly coinciding with business cycle turns
are, as one would expect, turns in such broad
measures of business activity as employment
and unemployment, gross national product, in-
dustrial production, bank debits outside New
York City,freight car loadings, corporate
profits, and wholesale prices (excluding farm
products and processed foods). During 1953-
1954 these behaved as in earlier cycles, on the
whole. Through the fall, winter, and spring of
1953-1954, all or most of these indicators were
falling, except between one pair of months in
the spring. By July half were falling, half ris-
ing.In October all were rising. As for the
group that usually lags turns in general busi-
ness conditions (personal income and retail
sales, consumer instalment debt and manufac-
turers' inventories, and bank rates on business
loans), four out of five were faffing as late as
August of 1954. Not until October were more
than half of them rising.1
In a word, then, the three groups of indi-
cators behaved during the revival of 1954 as
they had been found to behave during earlier
revivals. This is especially interesting because
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the recession from 1953 to 1954 had been ex-
ceptionally mild —farmilder than the "aver-
age" cycle of prewar experience. Of course,
there had been occasional mild recessions in
the prewar period also. During such recessions
a number of the indicators —especiallythe
lagging series —showedno obvious response
to the decline in business. The 1953-1954
recession resembled these earlier episodes in
that respect: personal income and instalment
debt did not decline appreciably after 1953.
Moore has developed further the diffusion
indexes first used in Measuring Business Cy-
cles. These measure the proportion of series
moving up or down and thus provide a simple
picture of their consensus. Together with the
diffusion indexes provided by Hultgren in his
paper on profits and by Burns in his "New
Facts on Business Cycles," they reveal in a
striking manner that cycles in different activi-
ties, or even in different firms engaged in the
same activity, do not follow the same temporal
course. During an expansion the maximum
identity of movement —hardlyever 100 per
cent —isreached some time before the peak
in aggregate activity appears. Months before
aggregate activity reaches its peak the propor-
tion of expanding industries or firms is already
declining. Months before the aggregate reaches
its trough the proportion of expanding activi-
ties is already rising. The diffusion indexes
thus constitute another leading group of indi-
cators. They have even more interest in indi-
cating how cross-currents grow in importance
during the complicated series of events we call
recession and revival.
More recently, the indicators and diffusion
indexes have been put on a current basis —
thatis, the turns are being calculated not from
observations of the whole cycle, including de-
velopments after the turns themselves, but
only from observation of developments up to
the month under consideration.Once one
'Computations are based on directions of change in
centered moving averages applied to each seasonally
adjusted indicator. The period of the average de-
pends on the extent of erratic changes:itis six
months at the maximum (for liabilities of failures).
For a few series the directions of change are on a
month-to-month basis.moves from hindsight to contemporary obser-
vation, cyclical turns become far more difficult
to identify. Changes that soon reverse them-
selves and therefore represent only temporary
interruptions to cyclical expansion or contrac-
tion appear to occur frequently. This too has
considerable scientific interest, as Ruth Mack's
book on the shoe-leather-hide industries dem-
onstrates. Any explanation of how business
cycles are generated must take account of the
incessant change that surrounds businessmen
and the effects this must have on their outlook
and behavior.
How helpful the indicators of cyclical reces-
sion and revival will be to those who wish to
detect the drift of business conditions remains
to be seen.The "current-basis" indicators
should aid in the experiment. It is safe to say
that anyone who uses them to the exclusion of
other information and ignores the reservations
with which Mitchell and Burns first surrounded
them is bound to be disappointed.
It is well to repeat some of these cautions,
just as Moore did, for the indicators cannot
provide the simple key to the future that folk
seek.
Mitchell and Burns mentioned the difficulty
of distinguishing an erratic fluctuation from a
cyclical turn in a particular process. It is prom-
inent in the charts of the current-basis indi-
cators already mentioned. There is danger,
therefore, in trusting the indications of single
series.It is necessary to search out the con-
sensus of groups of series, not confining atten-
tion to the twenty-one indicators alone. And
thisis important also because the cyclical
timing of a particular series may vary from
time to time —sometimesirregularly, some-
times secularly or structurally. There is need,
consequently, to be alert to the latter and
aware of the former.
The occasional appearance of "incipient re-
vivals which suffer a relapse" poses another
problem not to be ignored. An example ap-
peared during the deep depression of the thir-
ties, when the revival that seemed under way
at the middle of 1932 petered out in the fall
with a serious falling-off of business to another
low in the spring of 1933. Such a reversal in
direction might be encountered at other stages
of expansion and contraction also, as our ex-
perience in 195 1-1952 illustrates. In her study
of the shoe-leather-hide industries, Ruth Mack
gave special attention to the phenomenon as it
appeared in those branches of business. She
is exploring the matter further in the study of
short cycles.
Mitchell and Burns emphasized, in this
connection, the need to consider "important
factors arising outside the realm of business."
This has become increasingly important in re-
cent decades, with the growth of government
and such developments as the Employment
Act of 1946 and the cold war.
In man's persistent search for a clue to the
future, sequence analysis has long attracted
attention.If today we have a better under-
standing of its possibilities and its limitations,
it is because of the basic research that has been
done on business cycles.The businessman
who must speculate about the future course of
economic conditions knows more keenly than
before that he must "eschew simple formulas"
and study a wide range of data. His watch for
the typical sequence of events must be kept in
full awareness of the variation that character-
izes successive business cycles and the changes
that go on within them. He must be alert to
structural and secular "changes in the mak-
ing," yet resist the tendency to generalize too
easily on the basis of recent experience. He
must recognize that several possibilities lie be-
fore him and that probabilities have to be
attached to each of them; and he must stand
ready to revise the probabilities, and the judg-
ments and policies he bases on them, as evi-
dence accumulates from month to month. He
must be sensitive to the opportunities open to
his own firm, as well as to the general factors
that affect business as a whole.
Moore has followed his Occasional Paper
with other short pieces dealing with aspects of
the subject, one or two of which I have already
mentioned. Others of our staff have dealt or
are dealing with related questions. I can men-
tion only Hastay's work on businessmen's ex-
pectations —whichmay turn out to be more
useful for telling us something about business
9behavior than for adding to our kit of forecast-
ing tools. We plan to assemble the various
contributions into a volume that will include
also some of the statistical materials we have
used, thus making available to the public part
of the rich collection of time series that we
have accumulated and analyzed over the years.
The volume should prove valuable to the many
business economists and students of business
cycles who are aware of the need to improve
the knowledge and techniques which current
analysis must use, as well as of the need to
use what knowledg& and techniques we now
have as wisely as possible.
Before leaving this question, I would like to
recall a general conclusion of Mitchell and
Burns about the way to improve forecasting.
It points to the kind of work on which we must
concentrate the energies we devote to the sub-
ject of business cycles. Mechanical methods
of trying to improve prognoses, made on a
strictly empirical basis, seemed to them to be
less promising than efforts to learn about the
interrelations among the cyclical movements
of different economic processes. Our recent
work on statistical indicators gives every sup-
port to this conclusion.
At any moment, analysts of business condi-
tions must perforce apply what knowledge
they have of the connections between current
changes and the events that precede and fol-
low, uncertain though it may be. A major task
of our business cycle studies is to strengthen
this knowledge of the connections among
events —toforge links where they are now
lacking, and to replace weak links with stronger
ones, and so to help business analysts judge
the significance of the events that unroll before
their eyes.
If I had the time I could illustrate this proc-
ess of construction and reconstruction with our
studies of one of the elements of what is popu-
larly referred to as the "cost-price squeeze."
I would start with the account Mitchell gave in
1913 of how prosperity breeds depression and
recall his hypothesis that "the very conditions
that make business profitable gradually evolve
conditions that threaten a reduction in profits";
that among these conditions were rising prime
10
costs per unit of product, and counting heavily
in prime costs —thoughmore in some indus-
tries than in others —wereunit labor costs;
and that unit labor costs could be expected to
rise, especially in the later stages of business
expansion, first as a result of the characteristic
cyclical behavior of wage rates, and second
because of the probable cyclical behavior of
the quantity of labor used per unit of product.
I would then go on to show how Mitchell's
conjectures guided our work when we began
the study of business cycles; what questions
were raised about labor costs when Hultgren
came to grips with the matter, in so far as it
could be analyzed in the records of American
railroads; how Mitchell revised his hypothesis
in the light of this work and also of the Bu-
reau's studies of labor productivity, Creamer's
analysis of cyclical fluctuations in wage rates,
and his own preliminary analysis of the figures
for manufacturing; what Moore found when
he carried the analysis of the manufacturing
data a step forward; how the results obtained
for the interwar period compare with the re-
cent behavior of wage cost per unit; and what
Hultgren is doing to advance the analysis in
his current studies of costs in individual in-
dustries.Let me merely mention that our
studies do show that in manufacturing as a
whole, at least, labor cost per unit typically
turns upward in the final stages of business
expansion. While Mitchell's original hypothe-
sis about unit labor cost requires alteration in
certain significant details, its main point is con-
sistent with the facts for certain important in-
dustries as we have been able to observe them.
I turn now to another question, one that
suggests a new piece of basic research with in-
teresting possibilities for the analysis of cur-
rent business conditions.
III
During 1955 net public and private debt went
from $605 to $650 billion. Consumer mort-
gage and shorter-term debt rose over the year
as a whole by about $20 billion. The increase
in business debts added almost as much, $19
billion, state and local government debts, an-
other $5 billion, and the federal debt, anotherbiffion. The total of $45 billion constituted an
exceptionally large increase in volume of obli-
gations.Indeed, for a peacetime period, it
was unprecedented. During the 1920's, with
which comparisons are frequently made, debt
increase did not exceed $10 billion per annum
in any year.
Only in the postwar period itself was there
a comparable annual increase: the rise in debt
during 1950 had been almost as large. In fact,
every recent year has seen an increase in debt
of $20 billion or more. The total rise in the
net public and private debt between the end
of 1949 and the end of 1955 amounted to
$200 billion, more than the entire debt out-
standing at the end of 1929, and much more
than the $45 billion increase between 1923
and 1929. In terms of rate of growth, too, the
increase in debt during the past six years has
been relatively large, 45 per cent as compared
with about 30 per cent during the six-year
period ending in 1929.
The large addition to the volume of debt in
1955 has attracted wide notice, coming as it did
upon other substantial increases in preceding
postwar years. In many quarters, the rise in
debt has engendered great concern. But these
figures, while meriting close attention, are not
themselves sufficient to support some of the
judgments being made about thecurrent
situation.
There are, first, the obvious things that must
be kept in mind when one tries to judge the
postwar situation by comparing it with the
interwar (or any other) period. The dollar of
today is not the dollar of the 1920's; and even
more important, the economy of today is big-
ger than that of 1929. While debt at the end
of 1955 was 3.4 times what it was at the end
of 1929, the gross national product in current
prices was 3.7 times as great. Today's ratio of
total debt to gross national product is some-
what lower than it was in 1929.It is also
lower than it was in 1923 —and,I might add,
in 1949.
The more subtle considerations involved in
judging the significance of debt changes are
not as easy to put in the simple terms of figures
like those I have mentioned. Yet these consid-
erations are not to be ignored on that account.
For one thing, while current attention is
focused chiefly on the relation of debt to the
stability of the economy, that relation cannot
be understood apart from the secular and
structural changes that have characterized our
financial organization.
Debt and economic growth seem to go to-
gether. The practice of borrowing and lending
is a means to a higher standard of living for
the community: on the whole, it places funds
where they can be used to society's best advan-
tage.It does not follow, however, that debt
should be expected to parallel national prod-
uct and that only differences between the
two constitute cause for concern. Economic
growth, the rising standard of living it fosters,
and the altered industrial structure which is
one of its causes and one of its consequences,
bring with them changes in the form and
character of the claims which savers wish or
can be induced to hold, or investors wish or
can be induced to provide —mattersdiscussed
in the reports on our Conference on Research
in Business Finance and, most recently, in one
section of our conference volume on Capital
Formation and Economic Growth. Debt claims
are but one variety of claim, and changes in
them must be judged in the context of the
whole financial structure. Indeed, it is difficult
toclassify claims in distinct ways.They
merge into one another; and this too raises
some troublesome questions about the mean-
ing of the debt figures available.
Also, financial intermediaries change in re-
lation to the rest of the economy and in rela-
tion to one another.Thus the number of
stages and kinds of connections between ulti-
mate saver and ultimate investor are altered,
and with them the relative volume of debt.
The growth in size of nonfinancial corpora-
tions and the extension of their activities into
multiple fields also affect financial structure
and the relative importance and significance of
different sources and types of finance.
Moreover, economic growth has not been
the only factor causing change in the financial
system and in the place of debt in that system.
The momentous events of the Great Depres-
11sion and the Second World War also played a
part —byaltering price levels, creating a large
public debt, and enlarging greatly the govern-
ment's role in the financial as in other spheres.
Certain aspects of these changes in our fi-
nancial organization has been described and
subjected to analysis in the volumes prepared
by the National Bureau's Financial Research
Program under Young's and then Saulnier's
direction. The report by Grebler, Blank, and
Winnick on capital formation and financing in
residential real estate, in press, takes up an-
other part of the subject, as do other sections
of the National Bureau's Studies in Capital
Formation and Financing. A comprehensive
statistical outline is provided in Goldsmith's
monograph on Financial intermediaries in the
Saving and investment Process soon to be sent
to the printer.
The changes mentioned, and others, have
transformed the financial system.In many
ways it is a new system, different from the
structure of even twenty-five years ago. While
the broad outline of change is clear, we need
to know more about the present structure and
the events that have brought it into being if we
are to understand and assess current changes
in debt and related financial items. Everyone
is aware, for example, that many new govern-
mental credit institutions have entered the
scene, and the report which Saulnier, Jacoby
and Haicrow have completed on federal lend-
ing and guarantee describes this development.
But the effect of the new institutions on the
volume of debt and its significance for eco-
nomicstability;theeffectof government
policy, legislation and regulation on the com-
petitive position of various types of financial
institutions (which surely influences the vol-
ume and character of financial claims) —these
are still troublesome questions.
If we had a comprehensive account of the
new structure of credit and savings facilities,
and understood more fully its drift and its
causes, we would be better able to consider
such questions as those bearing on the rela-
tionship between debt and economic stability
and growth.
A start has been made in our study of the
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postwar capital markets. Using the structure
of accounts originated by Copeland in his
Study of Moneyflows and relying heavily on
the valuable statistics shaped in Copeland's
mold by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Goldsmith, Kiaman, Robin-
son, Shapiro, and their collaborators are look-
ing into this segment of our financial system.
We expect to learn more about its contem-
porary structure and some of the major reasons
for the changes that have occurred over the
past decade. We hope also to derive certain
by-products: to learn what new work in the
credit and capital markets would be most use-
ful, understand better the nature of the avail-
able information and perhaps stimulate the
production of new data, and discover the best
ways to tackle the problems outlined above.
The discussion now going on in financial and
governmental circles of the problems of inter-
institutional competition may lead to the de-
velopment of basic information that could be
put to good use.
Though study of secular and structural
changes in financial structure is essential to
our understanding of debt expansion, it is clear
that debt expansion cannot proceed indefi-
nitely at the pace of the past year. This raises
questions about the extçnt to which produc-
tion and employment can be maintained at
satisfactory levels and rates of growth when
debt expansion slows down or comes to a halt.
And the interlocking structure of long- and
short-term credits so rapidly built up poses
serious questions also about problems of ad-
justment should expansion of business be in-
terrupted.
This is especially the case when deteriora-
tion of credit standards has contributed in im-
portant ways to the increase in debt. That in
one sense or another the quality of credit does
seem to deteriorate during the course of an
expansion, particularly when it is prolonged
and its later stages take on the characteristics
of a boom, is shown in a number of our studies.
One of the studies is reported in Hickman's
second volume on corporate bonds, soon to be
submitted for approval to the Board of Direc-
tors; its title, Corporate Bond Quality and in-vestor Experience, indicates the kind of in-
formation it provides on this sector of the capi-
tal markets. The capstone volume by Morton
in our urban mortgage lending studies, just off
the press, brings together the results obtained
by Saulnier, Behrens, Harriss, Fisher, and Ed-
wards.Still a third study is described in the
volume by Jones and Durand on agricultural
mortgage lending published in 1954; and a
fourth, in Ilse Mintz's book of five years ago
on the deterioration in the quality of foreign
bonds issued in the United States during the
1920's.
The report by Jones and Durand has spe-
cial interest because they were able to take ad-
vantage of information for different areas of
the country to provide a variety of experience
otherwise difficult to obtain. Above-average
increases in farm mortgage debt between 1910
and 1920 were followed in the same areas by
especially high rates of "distress transfers" of
farms during 1925-1934. The picture is still
clearer when attention is focused on a rela-
tively homogeneous region like the corn-belt
states. There, increases in farm mortgage debt
between 1910 and 1920 were highly correlated
with increases in land values per acre during
the same period; and in the corn states in
which the boom in land values and land sales
generated by the first World War went farthest,
the later distress transfers were greatest.
In a brief paper —whichhe hopes to de-
velop more fully at a later date —Moorepoints
out that the difficulties of farmers during the
1920's kept down the volume and actually
appear to have improved the quality of new
farm credit. This was in sharp contrast to the
experience of the rest of the economy, which
was expanding rapidly in those years. In the
nonfarming sectors for which the studies men-
tioned provide information, the boom of the
twenties was accompanied by a serious and
widespread decline in the quality of credit. The
subsequent average default rate on domestic
corporate bond issues of 1925-1929 was 28
per cent, as compared with 16 per cent on
bonds issued during 1920-1924; on foreign
government dollar bond issues, 50 per cent
as compared with 18 per cent; on urban home
mortgage loans, 21 per cent as compared with
8 per cent; on urban business property mort-
gage loans, 37 per cent as compared with 14
per cent. These results, and those on farming,
confirm one another and suggest something of
the relation between boom conditions and
changing quality of credit.
Various factors contributed to the deteriora-
tion in quality of credit during the 1920's. One
seems to have been an increase in the prices of
assets financed with the loans, such as we
know occurred in the earlier boom in farming.
The maintenance of nominal lending standards
actually meant a hidden decrease in standards.
Another cause suggested by the data was re-
laxation of credit terms and lending standards,
coupled with a reduction in the risk premiums
sought or obtained by lenders. The basic fac-
tor may have been the overconfidence gener-
ated during the twenties by the relative mild-
ness of the contractions that occurred in 1923-
1924 and 1926-1927.
Developments of this sort have significance
for students of business cycles as well as for
observersof the contemporary scene.In
Measuring Business Cycles Burns and Mitchell
-suggestedthe hypothesis that "after a severe
depression industrial activity rebounds sharply,
but speculation does not. The following con-
traction in business is mild, which leads peo-
pie to be less cautious. Consequently, in the
next two or three cycles, while the cyclical
advances become progressively smaller in in-
dustrial activity, they become progressively
larger in speculative activity. Finally, the spec-
ulative boom collapses and a drastic liquida-
tion follows, which ends this cycle of cycles
and brings us back to the starting point." They
believed the hypothesis would repay explora-
tion. The information gathered in the studies
of credit by us and others is bringing closer
the day when such an adventure will be pos-
sible; further help, we may expect, will come
through the work on "long cycles" that Kuz-
nets, Hastay, and Abramovitz have been
doing.
At the moment, however, what we know
about credit during the business cycle is still
very limited and the materials available cur-
13rently are still scanty. These lacks affect the
present widespread discussion of the quality
of credit and the concern over its volume.
Opinions are expressed on the question of its
deterioration and judgments based on opin-
ions. But much of the discussion is confused
because some people mean one thing when
they speak of credit quality and of its de-
terioration and other people mean something
different. Confusion is further confounded by
lack of reliable current information on lend-
ing practices and the characteristics of loans
and borrowers, and by lack of understanding
of the significance of current information for
the problems that the future might bring.
Reliable and unambiguous information on
credit quality assembled and provided on a
current basis would not solve every problem
of financial management, but if properly in-
terpreted it would help financial institutions
and governmental authorities to make sounder
judgments. We are therefore thinking of a
study that would consider, and to the extent
possible devise, a system of current reporting
on the quality of credit. During our explora-
tion of the needs for research in the area of
credit and capital we have drawn up tentative
plans for such an undertaking.It should at-
tempt to clarify the meaning of the term
"credit quality." Alternative methods of meas-
urement should be devised and compared. The
information that can be extracted from exist-
ing records should be organized and analyzed.
Since new information is needed, the study
should develop practicable suggestions for col-
lecting it.Finally, the economic implications
of the data should be set forth in the light of
past experience and present-day conditions.
Failure to recognize the implications during
booms can pile up problems and contribute
to the severity of subsequent depressions. Simi-
larly, contraction may be prolonged by failure
to recognize that —whateverhas happened or
may be happening to old credit —newcredit
may be improving in quality during a de-
pression.
If we should obtain the funds necessary to
pursue this investigation and if we should at-
tain some measure of success in the endeavor,
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financial and governmental agencies might be
stimulated to set up and maintain a system of
reporting that would be helpful to all con-
cerned with providing and managing credit
under conditions of economic change. And we
might add to our knowledge of economic
behavior.
Iv
Permit me a final word about the objectives of
our program and the reasons why it is neces-
sary to look ahead.
The coming decade promises new oppor-
tunities and new responsibilities for the Ameri-
can people. Projected additions to the nation's
annual rate of production during the next ten
years amount to as much as $150 billion.
These form the planning base of the national
administration and of our leading business-
men, for they are well within the realm of
probability.Such enormous growth will re-
quire large expansion of our production ma-
chinery and our financial facilities. The rate of
investment and reinvestment of the nation's
savings, for example, will be pushed scores of
billions above present levels; the work re-
quired of the financial community will be
larger; this in turn will generate a demand for
enlarged and improved capacity of our mone-
tary, credit, and savings machinery, among
other things.
The next ten years will see also a major test
of our power to ward off the perils of depres-
sion and inflation. Undoubtedly, determined
efforts will be made by federal and state gov-
ernments to strengthen our defenses, efforts
that will be accelerated whenever business and
employment suffer contraction or prices begin
to rise rapidly. This too means a host of pro-
posals, good and bad, for revamping our eco-
nomic institutions and for extending the super-
vision of their operations.
Whatever else one may say about the fu-
ture, then, one thing is certain: it will bring
change; it will create demands to meet the
problems that change uncovers.
Economic research today can better pre-
pare us to satisfy these demands as they arise
in the future, just as research of the past is
helpful in meeting current problems. Surelywe now know more than we otherwise would
about the volume, dangers, and benefits of
consumer instalment financing —tomention a
topic being widely discussed —becausesome
years ago the National Bureau's Financial Re-
search Program included a broad study of
such credit. The report by Hoithausen, Mer-
riam, and Nugent that we published in 1940
paved the way for the current statistics on the
volume of consumer instalment credit; the
companionreportsby Young, Plummer,
Chapman, and Saulnier described the credit
practices, customers, operating methods, col-
lection experience, profitability, and other as-
pects of the business done by financial institu-
tions engaged in consumer instalment financ-
ing; Dauer's volume compared the operating
experience of some of these institutions; Cop-
pock's study discussed governmental agencies
of consumer instalment financing; Bernstein's
report pioneered in the use of consumer survey
data to reveal patterns of consumer debt;
Durand discussed in detail the risk elements
in consumer instalment credit; and, as I have
already mentioned, Haberler subjected cycles
in such credit to economic analysis. Because
of this work, and the work of others, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
will be better able, we may expect, to meet the
recent request of the President for a speedy re-
port on the need for stand-by legislation to
regulate consumer instalment credit. Never-
theless, there are still many important things
we do not know about consumer instalment
credit.If the "emergencies" that will arise in
the future are to be met with more tested
knowledge than we now have, we must acquire
that knowledge before the event.
It would be idle to suppose that any re-
search program, no matter how extensive,
could give us the full knowledge required to
deal confidently with the problem of debt or
with the other problems of growth and stabil-
ity that economic life may unfold, or to ap-
praise adequately all the solutions that in-
genious minds will offer.But whatever we
can learn about the operations of our economy
will help us resist hasty solutions and prepare
us to build sound ones.
This is the spur to those who engage in
economic research and those who support it.
As A. C. Simmonds, Jr., Chairman of the
Banking Research Fund of the Association
of Reserve City Bankers, put it last spring,
research contributes to our knowledge of
problems, to the formulation of policy, to the
improvement of public supervision, and to the
education of our citizens.These are worth-
while aims. Even a step in their direction is
important, for the fundamental issue is nothing
less than the shape of our political as well as
our economic future.
SOLOMON FABRICANT
Director of Research
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